‘That we disavow reflection is positivism.’
– Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

‘As soon as we renounce fiction and illusion, we lose reality itself; the moment we subtract
fictions from reality, the reality loses its discursive-logical consistency.’
– Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative

Abbreviations

JI: Jamaat-i-Islami
JIJK: Jamaat-i-Islami, Jammu & Kashmir
FAT: Falah-i-Aam Trust

INTRODUCTION

Human beings are, among other things, creatures of learning. Characterized by an unusually prolonged period of infantile helplessness and an extended period of childhood, human beings are born, and remain for a long time, perhaps forever, incomplete beings. The ‘incompleteness’ of the young presents itself as both a problem and an opportunity for the society. It is a problem because the induction of the child into culture and the socially normative adult subjectivity is not simply a ‘natural’ epiphenomenon of biological maturation. At the same time, the incomplete, open-ended, and plastic nature of the human animal affords the social order the opportunity to construct – to produce, to fashion – the subjectivity[1] of the young members of the society in accordance with the normative standards and models of its culture. The processes and practices of inducting the young into a culture or form of life is called education (Bruner, 1960). Education can, therefore, be thought of as a cultural universal: every known culture takes on the work of constituting the subjectivity of its members. In order to reproduce itself, every form of life must somewhat successfully transmit the explicit and the implicit dimensions of its culture to its young members. Culture, therefore, must be thought of as a pedagogic complex.

Complex societies, however, tend toward social differentiation: in other words, the society is progressively differentiated into quasi-autonomous spheres of activity, like politics, economy, religion, etc. (Juteau, 2003). Although these ‘spheres of the social’ are differentiated and all have their inner dynamics, nonetheless they are dialectically implicated with each other (Mihaltis & Valsiner, 2022). Each sphere creates its own ‘force field’ and exerts force onto other spheres. Under these conditions, education also becomes differentiated into a specialized sphere of the society. Nevertheless, it is not ‘independent’ of the influence of the other spheres of the society. In the contemporary societies, education is geared toward the cultivation of the skills of reading, writing, numeracy, and now increasingly a basic understanding of the workings of computers. However, insofar as education is also the process of the induction of the young into a societal culture, it cannot be a value-neutral enterprise – it functions as a vector of ideology[2] (Althusser, 1971). The incompleteness of the human animal, which opens up the possibility for symbolic culture, also creates the space for its ideologization. The concept of ideology is deployed across a wide variety of contexts from academic research through media discourse to everyday life. The term was coined by a French Enlightenment philosopher and aristocrat, Antoine Destutt de Tracy, in 1796. He conceived it as a rational and systematic “science of ideas”. Since then, however, the concept has taken a markedly different sense in both academic discourse and in everyday life. In order to start with our endeavor, we may proceed with a couple of general and simple definitions of ideology. Erikson and Tedin (2003) define ideology as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved”. According the Dutch social scientist, Teun van Dijk (2006), “as ‘systems of ideas’, ideologies are socio-cognitively defined as shared representations of social groups, and more specifically as the ‘axiomatic’ principles of such representations”. Further, van Dijk believes ideology to be central to the self-image and self-definition of a social group. A social group’s identity, purposes, values, and actions are said to coalesce around its ideological core. Thus, ideology may be seen as a discursive formation that defines the self-image of a social group and organizes its identity. It also frames the individuals’ and group’s goals, values, norms of action, and their relations with others. As discursive formations, ideologies make both descriptive and normative claims about the world. The normative vision of ideologies – the vision of how society ought to be organized – is derived from their descriptive apprehension of the world. Additionally, ideologies may also stipulate the modes of proper action and morally acceptable means for instantiating the world that ought to be.

In the modern era, ideology is thought to be ubiquitous. In fact, ideology is arguably an upshot of language and symbolic culture. Nonetheless, the dominant approaches to the study of ideology have tended to view ideology as a single, homogenous, and monolithic framework that situates its subjects and determines – á la letter – their thought, action, and affect. In other words, ideology and subjectivity are thought to have a one-on-one correspondence. Ideology, in a top- down fashion, is thought to determine the structure of subjectivity and the nature of experience. Although it operates at every level and in every sphere of society, like religion, media, entertainment, etc., education offers a privileged site for the social researcher to investigate the problem of ideology in the act as it were. As I have already mentioned, we can think of education – along with Jerome Bruner – as, broadly, the processes of the induction of a society’s young members into its symbolic and material culture.[3] The practices of education do not only seek to equip the students with skills and information. More importantly, they attempt to inculcate in the educatees modes of thinking and of valuing. They endeavor to constitute the symbolic frame through which the subjects would interpret and constitute reality itself. The construction of the subject’s symbolic frame through which they interpret and constitute (social) reality is thought to be the primary ideological task of education (Bourdieu, 1983). At this point, it would be appropriate to briefly review the historical development of the concept of ideology in the philosophical and social scientific discourse. A detailed conceptual genealogy of the concept has been traced out in the first chapter of the dissertation. At this point, however, a brief discussion would assist us in setting up the context of research and framing our research problems and objectives.

Over the last two centuries, since the term was introduced in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, the concept of ideology has been deployed, predominantly, in two different ways. And these two different usages of the concept have been in a constant tension with each other. On the one hand, the notion of ideology has been deployed in a critical sense. The tradition of deploying the concept in a critical vein goes back to the writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels (1844), with the publication of their seminal text The German Ideology. Marx and Engels included religion as well as philosophy in ideology and, essentially, viewed it as a misrecognition of reality. The task of materialist science was to dissolve the ideological misrecognition via the critique of ideology: Ideologiekritik.

The 20th century German sociologist, Karl Mannheim, thought of ideologies as complexes of beliefs and ideas articulated by the social elite and whose function was to disguise the real exploitation undergirding the social order. Curiously, Mannheim, also identified another type of ideology: a discourse that criticizes the existing social and political order of the society and seeks to organize opposition against it. He referred to such counter-discourses as utopias. Thus, Mannheim further complicates the concept of ideology. It is no longer just the elite discourse that obfuscates the relations of domination and operations of power in the social order. It is also the counter-discourse that critiques the existing order of things and posits an alternative sociopolitical vision. Also, the counter-discourse carries within it the potential to mobilize opposition against the reigning order. Therefore, while ideology proper is constituted by the ‘ruling ideas’ and serves a justificatory function for the existing order of things, utopia is an ideology that critiques the present in the name of an imagined future. In other words, utopia is the ideology of future. Mannheim’s work is an important milestone in the conceptual development of the notion of ideology. Nevertheless, ideology was still seen as the motivated apprehension of reality, as opposed to the disinterested conception of the world by science.

The Marxian tradition of thinking about the question of ideology was furthered and nuanced by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School who combined Marx’s critique of political economy and with a psychoanalytic critique of libidinal economy (Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm). Ideology was no longer simply a problem of knowledge: it was libidinally charged misrecognition. Thus, pure critique at the epistemic level was no longer sufficient to break the spell of ideology and usher in the reign of truth. The task, according to the Frankfurt Schoolers, was therapeutic as it was epistemic: the revolutionary act was to be the therapeutic moment that could – potentially – ‘cure’ the (collective) subject of its ideological illusion.

Further, in recent decades, American social psychology has also tried to grapple with the problem of ideology. Two major social psychological theories that deal with the question of ideology are the System Justification Theory and the Social Dominance Theory. Both the social psychological theories are suspicious of ideology and look at it in terms of distorted and motivated cognition of the world. Social Dominance Theory is put forth as a general theory of intergroup relations which examines the establishment and reproduction of social hierarchies between and within groups. The theory sees ideology as the central mechanism for legitimizing social hierarchies. Similarly, according to the System Justification Theory, the main function of ideology is justificatory and it seeks to legitimize the status quo. The theory posits a number of underlying motives – epistemic, relational, and existential – that translate into ideological support for the existing system. Both the theories are undergirded by American psychology’s positivism and both read deep biological imperatives into ideology. In other words, human beings are seen as wired for ideology. Further, the System Justification Theory has been accused of an entrenched status- quo bias, since it does not allow any space for critique of the ‘system’. Nevertheless, both social psychological theories evaluate ideology rather negatively.

Alternatively, a different approach in the social and human sciences has a tradition of employing the concept of ideology in a ‘value-neutral’ manner. This style of thinking about and with ideology is generally used by sociologists and political scientists. They usually deploy the concept of ideology to signify a configuration of ideas, opinions, and attitudes held by a group of people. Ideology is seen, simply, as a socio-cognitive schema that organizes the groups knowledge of the world and shapes their action in the social and the political fields. The ‘value-neutral’ approaches – at least, in sociology and political science – maintain an agnostic position toward the cognitive and epistemic claims of ideologies. They define their primary task to investigate the function of ideology in individual and group life, without committing themselves for or against the substantive claims of ideologies. I will explore the tension between the critical and value- neutral approaches to ideology in a bit more detail in the first chapter. Nevertheless, suffice it to say, in general, both approaches to ideology treat it as an inflexible schema that rigidly controls the total behavior of its possessor. Thus, it may be said, rather than the subject possessing ideology, it is the ideology that possesses the subject.[4] Ideology is thought to determine the subject’s behavior right down to the smallest details of everyday life. In other words, ideology is thought to usurp the subject’s agency.

A different tradition of thinking about ideology has emerged in the British discursive social psychology from the contributions of the Loughborough social scientist, Michael Billig (1991). Billig’s innovative approach to ideology derives from his dialogical conception of human thought (Billig & Shotter, 1998). He criticizes the excesses of the ‘computer metaphor’ in cognitivist psychology and argues that the human mind is not an ‘information processing machine’ fitted with inbuilt ‘cognitive schemas’ that simply categorizes the stimuli coming from the environment (Billig, 1985).[5] Instead, for Billig, human thought is languaged and, thus, fundamentally dialogical and rhetorical: people don’t just ‘process’ information, they take positions on issues, they criticize some positions and they justify others, and they seek to persuade people through different forms of speech and action.[6] And they do it reflectively and deliberatively (Billig, 1996). He also draws parallels between the ‘schema theory’ (DiMaggio, 1997) in the mainstream American social psychology and the theories of ideology. In both traditions of thinking, the human subject is posited, essentially, as a passive automaton. In the former, ‘schemas’ determine the person’s perception and behavior, while in the former the person is submerged into the ideological system.[7] Both intellectual traditions, for Billig, seek to efface the human subject’s capacity for reflection.

Billig proposes an alternative view of the speaking and thinking subject and, thus, an alternative conception of ideology. Billig argues thinking is irreducibly modeled on speech. And speech is, at least, as argumentative and rhetorical as it is constative (Austin, 1962). Also, following Mikhail Bakhtin (2010), he maintains that the nature of human thinking is essentially dialogic – it has a two-sidedness about it. The two-sidedness emerges partly from the fact that the symbolic realm of the society, from which everyday thinking derives its ‘elementary particles’, is itself riven with contradictions, tensions, and ambiguities. Although, Billig doesn’t theorize these symbolic tensions, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to assume they mirror, at least partially, the discordances and contradictions in the real of the societal structure. Paradoxically, at least in the Marxist tradition of thinking, the function of ideology is precisely the symbolic resolution of real contradictions. However, it seems ideologies reproduce the same contradictions they are supposed to mask. In other words, the mask itself unmasks.

Nevertheless, Billig’s invaluable theoretical contribution lies in his proposal of the dilemmatic nature of ideology (Billig, et al., 1988). He critiques the understanding of ideology and ideological thinking as monolithic and homogenous. He observes that the conventional images of ideology and ideological thinking are grounded in the assumption of homogeneity and inner consistency. Billig problematizes the notion of ideology as an airtight system of ideas and beliefs wherein every proposition is in total synergy with every other proposition. Instead, he posits the thesis of the dilemmatic nature of ideology. Billig’s thesis has two dimensions: a) there are (often) contradictions within and between ideologies operating in the same socio-symbolic space, and b) these contradictions structure the subject’s field of perception and action with ambiguities and tensions. The dilemmas of ideology arise precisely when the subject embedded in ideology encounters a situation which the ideology’s discursive resources cannot adequately grasp. The emergent dilemmatic scenarios and their semiotic and hermeneutic ambiguities force the subject to reflect and improvise. The ambiguities of the dilemmatic scenario, for Billig, complicate the relationship between ideology, subjectivity, and action.

Billig’s approach nuances our conceptualization of ideology and complicates our understanding of the interconnections between ideology, subjectivity, and action, but it does not cover everything. He advances our thinking about the concept of ideology and the discursive articulation of ideological processes in everyday life. Nevertheless, in his passion for the rehabilitation of the subject, he seems to overshoot his mark. As we have seen, Billig criticizes the characterization of ideologies as rigid and inflexible cognitive frameworks which directly determine behavior. He faults the theories of ideology for naïvely presuming a direct and uncomplicated causal relationship between ideology and human behavior. On the contrary, he argues, the human being – the subject of ideology – is interposed between ideology and action. In other words, for Billig, ideological propositions are (often) ambiguous and contradictory which need to be interpreted by the subject in the concrete moment of action. And the moment of hermeneutic ambiguity gives arise to dilemmatic scenarios. The subject must creatively engage with these dilemmatic scenarios and engage in a reflective course of action. However, while underscoring the contrary elements of ideology, Billig does not tackle the problem of the cohesiveness of ideological discourse: what is it that holds the discourse of an ideology together?

In other words, while focusing on its contrary elements, Billig ignores the discursive logic of ideology. Although several contradictory positions can be drawn from the premises of the same ideology, it doesn’t mean the ideology does not have a deeper discursive coherence. In fact, a primary discursive coherence of the ideology is the precondition for the emergence of the dilemmatic scenarios. If ideology were simply a collection of hotchpotch statements without any semantic logic and moral force, no dilemmas would arise. Existentially, the ideological dilemma requires an a priori fidelity to a quasi-coherent ideological project. Furthermore, without discursive and semantic cohesiveness, we cannot distinguish between two ideologies.

Thus, to account for the discursive coherence of ideology, I propose the concept of the points of anchorage. The concept has a Lacanian provenance and is inspired by Derek Hook lecture on Jacques Lacan’s notion of point de capiton (the ‘quilting point’). The ‘points of anchorage’ are the privileged signifiers or nodal points which discursively hold an ideology together. It is the specific configuration of these points of anchorage confers the ideology with identity. In other words, an ideology is itself because certain privileged signifiers (signs?) hold specific positions in its discursive universe. In order to grasp the role of the points of anchorage in ideology, we can think of the ship anchored on a harbor. If the ship is anchored too rigidly, the force of the waves could damage it. If it is too loose, it would crash into the neighboring ships. In other words, the anchor must be appropriately flexible. Similarly, an ideology’s ‘points of anchorage’ hold it together, while being sufficiently open-ended to allow for flexibility in interpretation and action.

The concept of ‘anchorage points’ does not seek to contradict or supplant Billig’s thesis of the dilemmatic nature of ideology. Instead, it acts as a supplementary concept. While dilemmas arise at the interface between ideology and subjectivity, the points of anchorage are the properties of discourse. Ideological dilemmas may arise from a number of different sources. It may be the internal tension between an ideology’s different anchoring points. Or, dilemmas may arise for the subject out of the contradictions between two or more ideologies operative in the socio-symbolic realm. Ideological dilemmas also emerge from the gap between the real and ideology’s capacity for its symbolization. Thus, there are multiple sources of ideological dilemmas.

Therefore, following Billig, we can assume that in the contemporary complex societies, ideologies are neither simple nor homogenous.[8] And, usually, it is not a single ideological vision that is disseminated, pure and undiluted, throughout the entire social order by means of education systems. The same social space can, often, be inhabited with multiple and competing ideologies and worldviews. Further, the hegemonic ideological vision of the dominant sociopolitical group may not circulate smoothly across the social body, especially around the margins and the edges (Rehmann, 2013). The hegemonic ideology is often refracted and, thus, ‘distorted’ as it seeks to penetrate across the multiple strata of the social formation. It would often have to contend with non-hegemonic counter-ideologies and competing weltanschauungs. At the same time, as we have seen, ideologies may, and often do, carry within themselves values, themes, and visions which may lead to their self-undermining.

The tasks I have tried to accomplish in this research work have been twofold: one, I have tried to problematize the unitary and homogenous conception of ideology current in social science in general and social psychology in particular. In other words, I have tried to complicate the relationship between ideology, subjectivity, and action.[9] In order to accomplish this task, I have relied on Billig’s innovative approach to understanding ideology in everyday life, especially his productive notion of the ideological dilemmas. However, as I have already pointed out, while Billig emphasizes the dilemmas and ambiguities engendered by the ideological subject’s encounter with the world, he does not fully reckon with the coherence and inner logic of ideological discourses. In this backdrop, I use the concept of anchorage points to designate the privileged signifiers or nodes that hold an ideology together. Put differently, it is the configuration of these privileged signifiers that confers identity upon an ideological formation.

Through these conceptual resources, I have sought to accomplish the second major task of this dissertation: I deploy these theoretical and conceptual resources – dilemmatic nature of ideology and anchorage points – upon an empirical object of study. The empirical object of this study is the engagement of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Kashmir with the educational thought of Abul Alaa Maududi. I have attempted to harness these concepts to investigate the ‘ideological dilemmas’ of Jamaat-i-Islami’s educational thought and practice in Kashmir and how do the teachers and students influenced by Maududi’s thought engage with his discourse on education. I have endeavored to identify the anchorage points or privileged signifiers in Maududi’s discourse and I have also sought to engage with the ‘ideological dilemmas’ arising out of the encounter between Maududi’s (educational) ideology and the exigencies of everyday reality of our research participants in Kashmir.

Before going any further, however, I must first briefly introduce Abul Alaa Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Maududi was born in 1903 in British India and grew up to be one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of the last century. His oeuvre has a staggeringly polymathic range. He has written about Islamic history, theology, jurisprudence, ethics, politics, and of course education. In fact, Wilfred Cantwell Smith has described him as “the most systematic thinker of modern Islam” (Smith, 1957). Maududi was one of the major progenitors of the discourse of Islamism. And, although the thematic scope of his work is astoundingly vast, his thinking is always preoccupied with the problematic of (colonial) modernity and its radical (Latin, radix = root) implications for the political and cultural weltanschauung of Muslims. In 1941, he founded the sociopolitical organization, Jamaat-i-Islami, as the ‘vanguard’ of his Islamic revolution (Nasr, 1994).

Jamaat-i-Islami is one of the largest ‘Islamist’ movements in the world to have emerged and developed during the last century. For tens of thousands of Muslims across the subcontinent, the movement continues to exercise a great deal of religious, spiritual, and political influence. Like a number of other concepts in the sciences of the social and the human, ‘Islamism’ is a contested concept with fuzzy boundaries and, at times, has unsavory connotations. Nevertheless, I decided to retain the concept as an analytic category, as it assists us in clarifying a crucial set of cultural, social, and political phenomena. In any event, the Islamists themselves make a distinction between ‘ordinary’ Muslims and the Islamiyuun, i.e., the Muslims who are part of the ‘Islamic movement’ (Azzam, 2001). Islamism(s) attempt(s) to articulate a discourse of politics of Islam and the Islamicate adequate for the conditions of colonial modernity. As such, it combines a powerful nostalgic desire with the formal and conceptual resources drawn – both consciously and unconsciously – modern philosophies and ideologies. The Iranian philosopher, Daryush Shayegan (1992), has argued that Islamism signifies the ideologization of Islam in modernity. The discourse of Islamism has been preoccupied with the cultural stasis and the political decline of the Muslim societies in the contemporary world. The goal of Islamism, of course, is to revive the torpid umma and rekindle the spirit of true Islam in the Muslims of the world. The proposed ‘method’ of Islamic renaissance is a grand gesture of historical mimesis – emulating, à la letter, the first generations of Muslims (Osman, 2016). In other words, the ‘pious predecessors’ (as-salaf as-saalihiin). In making this claim, Islamism makes a number of assumptions, each of which can and has been contended. The discourse of Islamism seems to rely on the notion of the ideal community wherein Islam, itself, was self-transparent to the first Muslims. It makes a further assumption of the transparency of the first ideal community to us. Put differently, it seems to contend, we can suspend the historical distance between the aslaaf and us. Furthermore, it assumes, both, the possibility and desirability of a return to a ‘lost utopia’. Thus, Islamism is animated by a furious desire of retrieving a lost tradition.[10] Nevertheless, as a discursive formation, it also borrows – conceptually, theoretically, and methodologically – from modern forms of thought. One could venture to say that Islamism is an ‘inauthentic’ discourse of authenticity and identity.[11] As a movement, Jamaat-i-Islami has woven itself around this kernel of the desire for the lost utopia.

Throughout this work, I shall discuss the history of Jamaat-i-Islami in Kashmir in some detail. I shall also engage with the thought of Abul Alaa Maududi and try to delineate the contours of the ideological weltanschauung he sought to construct. I identify the various points of anchorage which hold his discourse together and confer an identity upon it. I also engage in detail with Maududi’s thinking about education. Suffice it to say at this point of our conversation, Abul Alaa Maududi, even before he had conceived of the Jamaat, had seriously grappled with the problem of modern education for Muslims. In modernity, education as a vector of godless ideologies of Europe signified a moment of profound danger for the Muslim mind. At the same time, however, it was an unavoidable necessity for acquiring the cognitive and material resources in order to reconstitute the umma as a political force.[12] During the 1940s, Maududi’s thinking deeply influenced a set of young and educated Kashmiri Muslims and they began to work in the educational field even before the Kashmir chapter of the Jamaat was constituted in 1953. Eventually, over the succeeding decades of the 20th century, the Jamaat-i-Islami Jammu & Kashmir (JIJK) would go on to establish a network of hundreds of schools throughout the Kashmir valley. Most of these schools would, eventually, be run by an independent charitable trust, the Falah-i- Aam. However, many of the schools would also be technically – legally – independent from the JIJK as an organization. Nonetheless, the schools’ vision and orientation would still be anchored in weltanschauung explicated by Abul Alaa Maududi.

In fact, in Kashmir, the JIJK’s educational activities have been central to the organization’s mission and self-understanding. And, it seems, the active role of the JIJK in the field of education in Kashmir over the course of last seven decades has been crucial to its organizational reproduction and ideological expansion. The JIJK has had an antagonistic relationship with the Indian state in Kashmir. Nonetheless, it has been forced to work within its political and institutional matrix, especially in the domain of education wherein the curriculum and the objectives of the process of formal education are largely defined by the agencies of the state. The task of the network of schools established by the JIJK has been to intercalate itself between the Indian state and the Kashmiri people (in this case, especially the school-going children). As has already been mentioned, Abul Alaa Maududi had perceived modern education as the site of profound cultural and ideological danger. Nevertheless, it also remained an indispensable site of intellectual engagement for the Muslim umma to reconstitute its political and cultural power. The activist-ideologues of the JIJK accepted Maududi’s assessment of modern education as, both, a site of ideological and theological danger and a place for the cultivation of forms of knowledge and a mode of subjectivity equipped to struggle with the challenges of modernity. This basic stance of ambiguity toward the problem of education was further complicated, for the JIJK, by an intractable political fact: the post- partition political control over Kashmir of the Indian state (Lamb, 2003). The political situation imposed a structural limitation upon the JIJK’s ‘freedom’ to constitute an ex-nihilo educational program for the re-islamization of the Kashmiri Muslim society. The movement was, as it were, forced to work within the institutional and political space afforded by the central state. In the context of Kashmir, for the JIJK, education was not just the site of the dissemination of godless ideologies of modernity. It was also seen, perhaps correctly, as the locus, for the central state, for the discursive construction of obedient and patriotic citizen-subjects. Thus, the JIJK was wary of the ‘assimilationist agenda’ of the Indian state and sought to contest it politically, culturally, and in the domain of education as well.

The general problematic of this dissertation has been to explore the emergent ideological dilemmas in the Jamaat’s thought and practice of education in Kashmir. I contend that Jamaat-i- Islami is not simply socio-religious movement or a set of organizations operating across the subcontinent. It is also a discursivity – in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 1991). Abul Alaa Maududi was the founder-author of the discursivity. In a discursivity, the movement of thought is not linear. It is essentially recursive. For the new sensibilia and experiences to be represented and integrated into the consciousness and for new thought to be legitimated (or delegitimated), they have to loop through the conceptual universe elaborated by the founder-author of the discursivity. In this sense, Maududi holds the same place in the discursive ensemble of the Jamaat as Marx and Freud do for Marxism and psychoanalysis respectively. The founder-author himself functions as a point of anchorage through which every affirmation or negation of the basic theoretical and conceptual postulates of the discursivity has to necessarily pass. The status of the figure of the founder-author in a discursivity is not just theoretical; more fundamentally, it is ethical and ideological.

Recognizing the centrality of the figure of Abul Alaa Maududi for, both, Jamaat’s epistemic coherence and organizational cohesion, I seek to explore the reception of and negotiation with his educational thought by the ‘educators’ of the JIJK. The inquiry, I hoped, would furnish us with an understanding of the thought and practice of education of the JIJK. It would also seek to investigate the engagement of educators and educatees with Maududi’s ideological weltanschauung and his philosophy of education. The empirical case study, I hoped, would enrich our understanding of the concepts of ideology, education, and their interrelation. It would, perhaps, also nuance our understanding of the engagement of people – educators and educatees – with the ideologies in education and ideologies of education. My empirical study was based on the ‘data’ collected from my fieldwork. During the fieldwork, interviewed more than a dozen educators and educatees – teachers, students, school administrators, alumnae, etc. – of schools ideologically filiated with the JIJK and the figure of Abul Alaa Maududi. The text of the interviews was investigated through Ian Parker’s discourse analytic ‘method’. The analysis of the interview texts showed the discourse of my interlocutors surrounding the question of their engagement with Maududi’s weltanschauung and its practice in everyday life was full of tensions, ambiguities, and ideological dilemmas. At the same time, the discourse of my interlocutors was anchored in and around the privileged signifiers of Maududi’s thought. In this way, I have brought the theoretical framework that approaches ideology as a coherent yet dilemmatic discourse to bear upon ideology-as-lived. And, thus, I have sought to show lived experience of the subjects of ideology is characterized by dilemmas, ambiguities, tensions, and contradictions. I believe the investigation has allowed me to demonstrate the complexity of ideological thinking and to problematize the interrelationship of ideology and subjectivity.

Every exploration in the sciences of the human and social is limited by its specific historical and sociocultural context. There is much in human life which is local, unique, unrepeatable, and fluid. Yet, it is the objective – stated or unstated – of every systematic inquiry make and defend claims about the general nature of (social) reality, beyond its specific subject matter. Thus, I have sought, through the exploration of Maududi’s educational thought and the JIJK’s engagement with it, to think through about the general problem of ideology, education as a terrain of ideological contestation, and the human subject’s engagement with ideology and the dilemmas and ambiguities of thought and action it engenders.

Research Objectives

Before giving a detailed outline of the chapters of the dissertation, I would first restate, schematically, the research objectives that have been weaved into the narrative so far and toward which this investigation is aimed at.

• To explore the concept of ideology and to problematize and complicate the presumed interrelationship between ideology, subjectivity, and (social) action.
• To investigate Abul Alaa Maududi’s ideological weltanschauung and, especially, to explore his thinking about the problem of education.
• To explore and understand Abul Alaa Maududi’s educational thought and its reception among the educators and educatees of the JIJK and its relationship with the movement’s larger ideological project of the Islamization of the Kashmiri Muslim society and resistance to and rejection of the unislamic, the godless, the secular, etc.
• To investigate the “ideological dilemmas” and ambiguities that arise, in the domain of education, from the contradiction between the group’s ideological weltanschauung and the ideologies of secular modernity immanent in modern education.

Hopefully, by this point, the reader would have grasped the task of the dissertation. My basic objective was reading the reception of Abul Alaa Maududi’s educational thought through the lens of Michael Billig’s critical social psychology of ideology (Billig, et al., 1988). The theoretical advantage of Billig’s approach is that it does not treat the relationship between ideology and subjectivity as linear, one-dimensional, and top-down. It takes seriously the socially constituted psychology of the subject and, thus, restores the dignity of thought to the individual. The subject is no longer simply the carrier of an ideological program. Instead, he or she actively and reflexively engages with the propositions of ideology. The subject’s engagement with ideology, from his or her position in the social totality, gives rise to ideological dilemmas. Ideological dilemmas are the ambiguities of thought and disposition engendered either by the gap between ideology and social reality or by the ‘inner contradictions’ of the ideology. In other words, this work seriously questions the presumption of a one-to-one relationship between ideology and subjectivity. Such an approach inevitably ends up collapsing subjectivity into ideology or discourse. Thus, there is no place for psychology in a theory of ideology without the subject.

Furthermore, ideologies aspire to be weltanschauungs. Freud defines a weltanschauung as a single overriding hypothesis that purports to explain the totality of reality – every condition and every contingency. In other words, a weltanschauung is a ‘theory of everything’. And the desire of Abul Alaa Maududi’s discourse is precisely that: to afford contemporary Muslims a weltanschauung equipped with an adequate arsenal against the ideologies of a secular(-izing) modernity (Taylor, 2007). To the degree that he succeeded in his intellectual ambition is an open question. For his followers, Maududi has accomplished the most comprehensive re-articulation of Islam in the contemporary era and equipped them with the ideological resources to resist the flood of materialism, atheism, and secularism. For his detractors, both within and outside Islam, Maududi has been one of the mainsprings behind the rise of the militant forms of Islam in the last four decades and is, thus, held to be one of the main intellectual culprits of the contemporary ideologization of Islam and its degradation into a mere political ideology (Nasr, 1996). As a researcher, I have tried to resist the temptation of either condemning or lionizing Maududi. In the final analysis, I do not believe, Maududi’s rearticulation and reconstruction of the Islamic religious thought manages to domesticate modernity. The forces of modernity – its episteme and techne – are so overwhelming that they even manage to turn their opponents into a grotesque caricature of their former selves. On the other hand, I believe, it is uncharitable and simplistic to blame religious thinkers and intellectuals, including Maududi, for the depredations of militant Islamism. The reflex of assigning ‘moral culpability’ and blame is especially strong in ‘terrorism experts’, ‘security analysts’ and embedded journalists (Stampnitzky, 2014). The line of thinking ignores the concrete social and political facts – like, settler-colonialism, military dictatorships, neocolonialism, etc. – in the countries and regions inhabited by Muslims and reads the problem of violence (Islamist and non-Islamist) into the cultural logic of Islam(-ism) itself (Said, 1997). Furthermore, as I have endeavored to show throughout this work, the relationship between the ideological frame and human subjectivity is characterized with dilemmas, contradictions, and ambiguities. Ideologies and worldviews – including Maududi’s – do not automatically lead their subjects toward a predetermined outcome (even though, as we shall see, Maududi himself believes to the contrary). There is, indeed, a space between ideology and action wherein the subject engages with the postulates of ideology. And it is precisely this space of engagement that critical social psychology of ideology seeks to retrieve and investigate.

Outline of the Chapters

The rest of the dissertation is organized into different chapters exploring different facets of the problem I have thus far endeavored to lay out. The first chapter briefly traces the conceptual genealogy of the notion of ideology. I begin at the beginning: the deployment of the notion of ‘ideology’ by the French philosophe, Destutt de Tracy, in the context of the French Revolution, to signify the ‘science of ideas’ in contract with the theology of the Catholic Church. The concept begins to be deployed in a critical vein with the publication of The German Ideology (1846/1970) by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Ever since the publication of Marx and Engels’ masterpiece, ideology became a central concept of Marxism and, later, critical theory. The last great theoretician of ideology in the Marxist tradition discussed in the literature review is Louis Althusser and his theory of ideological interpellation. I also discuss the use of the concept of ideology in sociology of knowledge (Karl Mannheim) and in American social psychology. Toward the end of the chapter, I deploy Michael Billig’s understanding of ideology and his social psychology of ideological thought to critically read the notions of ideology discussed thus far. Billig’s concept of ideological dilemmas allows us to critique the shortcomings of the approaches to ideology among both the theorists of ideology and social psychologists. I introduce the notion of points of anchorage to supplement Billig’s approach to ideology. Through the configuration of ‘anchoring points’, we can identify ideology as a relatively stable discursive matrix. The latter part of the first chapter gives an account of the methodological approach and the method deployed throughout the work for the investigation of texts and interview material. I argue, discourse analysis, as elucidated by the critical psychologist and Lacanian psychoanalyst Ian Parker is an appropriate methodological framework to approach the problems and questions operative at the level of subjectivity: in our case, ideology, education, and their interpenetration. The attentive reader would notice there is a glaring omission in my discussion of ideology: I have not discussed the work of Slavoj Zizek. Zizek is perhaps the most celebrated theorist of ideology alive today. However, at the time of writing up the review, I did not have the intellectual resources to tackle the heavy use of Hegelian and Lacanian theory in Zizek’s work. Nonetheless, I now recognize, the omission has left a hole in the chapter.

In Chapter 2, I endeavor to accomplish two tasks. One, I try to situate Abul Alaa Maududi’s intellectual and political development in its proper historical context: the social and political scenario of the decades leading up to the decolonization and partition of British India. I track Maududi’s journey from a young Indian nationalist who wrote panegyric biographies of Mohandas Gandhi and Madan Mohan Malviya to 20th century’s foremost ideologue of Islamism. In the second half of the chapter, I give a historical account of the genesis and development of Jamaat-i- Islami in Kashmir – as an organization and as a movement. Following the pioneering work of Yoginder Sikand, I try to locate the pre-history of the Jamaat in Kashmir in the earliest attempts at Islamic reform in the late 19th century led by Mirwaiz Rasul Shah. I also highlight the centrality of education to the JIJK’s mission in Kashmir and clarify the role of the Falah-i-Aam Trust in running the network of schools ideologically filiated with the Jamaat’s weltanschauung. Needless to say, it is not a work of history and I have not done any original historical research. Original historical research is, I believe, the proper domain of the historian. The historian operates at the frontier of established historical knowledge and seeks to constantly expand the horizon of our historical consciousness. The social scientist, on the other hand, is obliged to make do with what the Pakistani theologian, Javed Ghamidi, calls established history: the historical knowledge already in existence in the community (Ghamidi, 2001). Nevertheless, the social scientist cannot afford to ignore the historicity of the phenomenon they are seeking to understand. In fact, in social psychology, the calls to attend to the historicity of its subject matter go a long way back. In a landmark paper, written in the 1970s, the US social psychologist Kenneth Gergen, argued for approaching social psychology as a historical rather than a natural science (Gergen, 1973). However, the call for attending to the historicity of sociopsychological phenomena was studiously ignored by the American psychological establishment. On the other hand, the critical and discursive psychologies that came out of the ‘crisis’ in social psychology (Parker, 1989/2014), have integrated the historicity of (social) subjectivity as a grounding assumption into their approaches to understanding the experience and action of human beings. Keeping these points in mind, I have sought to give a situate both Maududi and the JIJK in their proper historical context.

The chapters 3 and 4, I wrestle with Maududi’s thought and endeavor to cull out a theory of education from the thinker’s massive oeuvre. However, I do not approach his thinking about education directly. Instead, first I seek to explore the foundations of his thought. The third chapter constitutes of a close reading of a seminal text in Abul Alaa Maududi’s corpus, Islam aur Jahiliyat, written somewhere between the late 1930s and early 1940s. An engagement with the text allows me to develop what I have dubbed as Maududi’s fundamental anthropology: his conception of the nature of the human being and its place in the cosmic order. Maududi posits two different existential orientations of human life which, according to him, engender two logically and existentially incompatible forms of life – Islam and jahiliyat. Jahiliyat is Islam’s Other. It is everything that is not Islam. For Abul Alaa Maududi, these ‘incompatible’ forms of life are locked into a transhistorical ‘dialectical’ struggle against each other. However, it is a dialectic sans sublation, in which Islam and jahiliyat, like oil and water, maintain their distinct identities and do not resolve into a higher synthesis.

In chapter 4, I engage critically with the political and educational implications of Maududi’s ideological discourse. I discuss how he read modern political and social categories into the originary history of Islam. The chapter leans heavily on the political anthropologist Irfan Ahmad’s (2010) reading of Maududi’s political theology. I also briefly deploy the Freudian notion of ‘retroactivity’ (Nachträglichkeit) to highlight the operation whereby the meaning of the past is altered by the events in the present. As the Lacanian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, writes, ‘Every historical rupture, every advent of a new master signifier, changes retroactively the meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the past, and makes it readable in another, new way’ (Zizek, 1989). In the same way, Abul Alaa Maududi provides a new reading of Islam: for him, Islam was always already the ‘state form’ right from its origins. The second half of the chapter deals, specifically, with Maududi’s thinking about education. He is highly critical of the traditional system of education of Muslims, revolving around the madrassa and the dars-i-nizami. He accuses the clerical establishment in charge of the madrassa education of failing to maintain a living culture of knowledge production and entrenching a culture of obscurantism in the Muslim society. At the same time, he is relentless in his critique of the modernist attempts of importing the European systems of education, along with their sciences and philosophical systems. He argues, the modernist project of the wholesale importation from the West would lead to the undermining of Islam in the Muslim societies, because the European sciences are based upon the metaphysical assumptions of naturalism and ontological materialism. Maududi believed it was both possible and desirable to import the techne of the modern sciences and graft it onto the episteme of Islam. Indeed, he believed, it would be the best of all possible worlds. Muslims would gain access to the immense power of modern science without having to sacrifice their faith at its altar. And this is the goal toward which Abul Alaa Maududi’s theory of education is geared.

The fifth chapter is the last. In this chapter, I engage with the interviews I conducted with people involved in the schools run either by the JIJK’s Falah-i-Aam Trust or schools ideologically inclined toward and sympathetic to the weltanschauung of the Jamaat and Abul Alaa Maududi. During my fieldwork, I conducted more than a dozen intensive interviews and conversations with teachers, students, administrators, and even a couple of alumnae of the schools ideologically filiated with the Jamaat. Most of the interviews and conversations were in-depth and stretched for more than an hour. My engagement with the material was guided by Ian Parker’s approach to discourse in social psychology (Parker, 1992). In other words, I tried to read the interview texts against the backdrop of Abul Alaa Maududi’s discourse. I have been especially attentive to the points where ideological dilemmas could arise: that is, the points of inner contradiction in the narrative of my interlocutors, the loci of negation and ambiguity, and even the odd silences. In this way, I endeavored to flesh out the ideological dilemmas which characterize the educational thought and practice of my interlocutors.

In the last section of the dissertation, I give a brief general discussion. In this section, I discuss the implications of my research for the social psychology of ideology. In particular, I underscore how the notion of the dilemmatic nature of ideology problematizes and complicates our understanding of the relationship between ideology, subjectivity, and social action. Furthermore, I reflect on the questions raised in the beginning of the research and their possible resolution. Additionally, I also discuss the limitations of my dissertation. For one, all of my research participants were male. Thus, insofar as gender as a social and experiential category is concerned, the study is extremely lopsided. Also, it was through the research process, the limitations of a purely discursive approach to the social psychology of ideology became clear to me. It was not easy to integrate the essentially frontier concepts of desire, affect, anxiety, etc., into the conceptual infrastructure of the study. At the end of the study, I came to realize that in order to construct an adequate social psychology of ideology, we not only need a language to talk about language (or discourse), we also need a vocabulary of desire. The absence of a vocabulary of desire from the work has left a hole in it.

Notes

[1] I conceive of ‘subjectivity’ in a broad sense to include the socio-ideological production of the individual’s consciousness, modes of thought and perception, affective investments, and embodied habits, etc.

[2] I am deploying the distinction between skills and values as an analytic heuristic. Of course, skills, tools, technologies, etc., are not separable from values embodied in them. Different skills and technologies embody different worldviews and modes of ‘unveiling’ of the world. They also constitute different life-worlds. In other words, there is no sharp line differentiating the techne from the episteme.

[3] One must take care not to reify the distinction between symbolic and material culture. The two are facets of one (open) totality and interpenetrate each other. In other words, in cultures, the sign and the matter for dialectical relationships.

[4] The subject can be thought of as both the individual and the collective. Although mainstream psychology focuses primarily on the individual, but ideology is always already social.

[5] One must also pay attention to the word ‘environment’ as a rhetorical device in the language of academic psychology: the word evokes associations with the ‘natural environment’ and, thus, represses the historically constructed nature of the human lifeworld and its context.

[6] The speech act theory has taught us, there can be no clean distinction between pure speech and pure action: speech acts and action speaks.

[7] One must also pay attention to the employment of the word ‘behavior’ in mainstream psychology instead of words like action, conduct, act, etc. ‘Behavior’ evokes the themes of ‘naturalness’, regularity, and being uncontaminated by culture. In principle, the psychologist can study the ‘behavior’ of both rats and human beings in the same laboratory with the same tools. Ideally, the psychology would scrape away the ‘cultural accretions’ and hit solid ground with the ‘natural foundations’ of human behavior.

[8] It does not mean non-contemporary and ‘non-complex’ societies are necessarily ideologically homogenous. The older generation of social scientists (especially anthropologists) have been criticized for depicting tribal societies as ideologically homogenous. It simply means, while ‘ideologically homogeneity’ may have been a hypothetical possibility in pre-modern social forms, it is no longer the case. Nonetheless, we must not underestimate the cultural complexity and ideological heterogeneity of nonmodern forms of life.

[9] Throughout the work, I have generally eschewed the word ‘behavior’ for words like ‘action’, ‘conduct’, ‘act’, ‘practice’ because of the former’s naturalizing meaning in psychological discourse.

[10] As is the case with all the lost objects of desire, they are constituted precisely in the moment of their loss.

[11] Perhaps, all discourses of authenticity and identity are, in the final analysis, inauthentic.

[12] I am reminded of the concept of pharmakon in critical philosophy derived from Plato and extensively developed by Jacques Derrida: the point of coincidence of poison and remedy.

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